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Democratic Institutions and Environmental Quality: Effects and 
Transmission Channels  
KINDA Somlanare Romuald1 
Abstract 
This paper aims at analysing the effect of democratic institutions on environmental 
quality (carbon dioxide per capita, sulfure dioxide per capita) and at identifying potential 
channel transmissions. We use panel data from 1960 to 2008 in 122 developing and 
developed countries and modern econometric methods. The results are as follows: Firstly, we 
show that democratic institutions have opposite effects on environment quality: a positive 
direct effect on environment quality and a negative indirect effect through investments and 
income inequality. Indeed, democratic institutions attract investments that hurt environment 
quality. Moreover, as democratic institutions reduce income inequality, they also damage 
environment. Secondly, we find that the direct negative effect of democratic institutions is 
higher for local pollutant (SO2) than for global pollutant (CO2). Thirdly, the nature of 
democratic institutions (presidential, parliamentary) is not conducive to environmental 
quality. Fourtly, results suggest that the direct positive effect of democratic institutions on 
environment quality is higher in developed countries than in developing countries. Thus, the 
democratic process in the first group of countries has increased their awareness for the 
environment protection. 
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inequality (D31); Investments (E22)  
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1. Introduction 
Many environmental problems can be explained by institutional failure and bad 
governance methods. At international level it is difficult to elaborate efficient and equity 
systems for environment resources management like oceans and climate warming. The 
Summit of Copenhagues (2009) put into in light real and enormous problems in international 
cooperation between countries for fighting climate warming. Though scientists reports 
emphasize that countries should act rapidly for reduce greenhouse effect gases responsable of 
climate warming. They also mention the huge challenge that international community must 
face, and especially democratic countries, to improve the situation.  
In the analysis of the determinants of environmental quality, political determinants 
received relatively less attention than economic factors. As shown in table (1a & 1b), the 
simple correlation between an index of democratic instutions and environment quality 
(,) is positive but weak over the period 1960-2008. Thus it comes as no surprise that 
literature on this topic finds mitigated results. Indeed, some authors find that democratic 
institutions favour environment protection whereas others conclude to a negative effect.  On 
nineteen empirical studies (table (2)), six uncovers a negative association between 
democracies and environment quality, nine find a positive association and the remaining four 
are inconclusive.  However, a limit of these papers is that they don’t explicitily identify 
channel transmissions of democratic institutions on environment quality. Indeed, findings that 
democracy has a mitigated partial effect on environment quality may hide the fact that it 
entails both costs and benefits. Identifying and specifying the channel transmissions from 
democratic institutions to environment protection will allow a better understanding of 
environmental costs and benefits of democratic institutions.  
This paper aims at analysing the effect of democratic institutions on environment 
quality and at identifying channel transmissions. The main contribution of this paper is that 
we identify and test some channels by which democratic institutions affect the environment 
quality. We identify and test two transmission channels : income inequality and investments. 
We use panel data from 1960 to 2008 for 122 countries and modern econometric methods that 
are one-step GMM-System, two-step GMM-System one step, fixed effect estimators and the 
residuals generated regressors. The results are as follows: Firstly, we show that democratic 
institutions have opposite effects on environment quality; a positive direct effect on 
environment quality and a negative indirect effect through investments and income inequality. 
Indeed, democratic institutions attract investments that hurt environment quality. Moreover, 
as democratic institutions reduce income inequality, they also damage environment. Secondly, 
we find that the direct negative effect of democratic institutions is higher for local pollutant 
(SO2) than for global pollutant (CO2). Thirdly, the nature of democratic institutions 
(presidential, parliamentary) is not conducive to environmental quality. Fourtly, results 
suggest that the direct positive effect of democratic institutions on environment quality is 
higher in developed countries than in developing countries. Thus, the democratic process in 
the first group of countries has increased their awareness for the environment protection. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section outlines the arguments on the 
relation between democratic institutions and environment quality and discusses on previous 
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empirical findings. In section 3, we identify potential channel transmissions between 
democratic institutions and environment quality.  Section 4 derives estimating equations and 
shows empirical results and the last is devoted to the conclusion. 
 
2. Effect of Democratic institutions on environment quality  
The relation between democratic institutions and environment quality has been 
studied. Some authors conclude that democratic insitutions favour environment protection 
whereas others find negative effect.  
2.1. Theorical arguments 
2.1.1. Democracy improves environment quality  
According many authors, democracy is vertious and has a positive effect on environment 
quality. Payne (1995) argues that population, in democratic countries, are free to collect 
information about environment quality. They can express their preferences and put pressures 
on their governments. With democacy, citizens are more aware of environment problems 
(freedom of media). They can also express their preferences for environment (freedom of 
expression) and create lobbying groups (freedom of association). Political leaders are 
prompted (rights to vote) to implement environmental policies at national and international 
levels. McCloskey (1983) and Payne (1995) put on relief an important ability of democratic 
countries to satisfy people’s environmental préférences and their will to commit themselves to 
international negociations and agreements. Economics models (Page and Shapiro (1983)) 
about the link between public and political decisions suggest that when people are well 
informed about major problems, the latter are widely influenced. In autocratic regimes, 
populations cannot access information and create lobbying groups. 
Deacon (1999) and Olson (1993) argue that political freedoms are in favour of 
environmental protection because non democratic regimes will under produce environment 
considered as a public good. According to them, autocratics regims are led by political elites 
who monopolize and hold large share of national incomes and revenues. The implementation 
of rigorous environmental policies can lower the levels of production, income and 
consumption, which, in turn impose a higher cost on the elite in an autocracy than on the 
population whereas the marginal benefit is uniform for both elite and population. Elites in an 
autocracy are therefore relatively less pro-environment than people in democracy.  
According to Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), in democratic countries, the majority of 
citizens have right to vote, to their preferences and the government is supposed to represent 
that in economic policies. As the preferences of median voter are important in democratic 
elections and it marginal cost of the implementation of environmental policies is lower than 
autocratic leaders, the adoption and implementation of environmental policies will prevail in 
democratic countries. The leaders in the preservation of biodiversity or fighting of climate 
change would be models for other countries. 
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Congleton (1992) analyses the effect of political regimes (democratic or autocratic) on 
environmental policies. He supposes that temporal short horizon contributes to a weak 
regulation of environmental policies. As the consequences of environment degradation appear 
on the long term, political leaders can have myopia behaviour and under produce 
environment. Indeed, the short duration of electoral cycles incites political leaders to adopt 
economical politics favourable to their re-elections. It is difficult to implement policies and to 
impose to population, who are also voters, a change of behaviour on problems which the 
consequences will be at the future.  
2.1.2. Democray hurts environment quality 
 Many authors think that democracy does not favour environment protection. The 
implementation of democratic institutions comes with individual freedoms. Desai (1989b) 
thinks that democracy doesn’t protect environment because democracy is a factor of 
economic growth and prosperity, which hurt the quality of environment. Democracy is also 
correlated with factors such as property rights and social infrastructures that boost economic 
growth.  
Firstly, Hardin (1968) worries about the management and overexploitation of environmental 
and natural resources. The property rights of environmental and natural resources (for 
example air, oceans, forests) are not well defined. This overexploitation is accelerated in 
democracies in which individuals have business and economic freedom. 
Secondly, Paehlke (1996) thinks that the nature of environment and democracy are different. 
Environment is a global phenomena whereas democacy works on national and local levels. 
Consequently, environmental problems could not be resolved in an adequate and opportune 
way. For example, Heilbronner (1974) supports the idea that global growth of population 
threatens environmental quality. Autocratic countries can restrain demographic dynamic 
while democratic countriest must respect people freedoms. 
Moreover, Dryzek (1987) notices that democracies are also economic markets wherein 
lobbying groups are very important. According to him, there are many countries where 
political leaders are influenced by lobbying groups and multilateral companies. Democracies 
are not considered as protecting environment quality as they are supposed to satisfy the 
preferences of markets and lobbying groups which aims at maximizing their economic profit 
that is not in favour of a better environment quality.   
Finally, we think that when democracy is established, institutions becomes more complex and 
rigid. So, Olson (1982) and Midlarksy (1998) claim that lobbying groups are partially 
responsible for the rigidity of institutions in mature democracies. In other words, in mature 
and democratic countries, the supply of public goods could be reduced by an important 
number of lobbying groups which are less or not incited to take care of society interests. They 
can try to influence or to control legislatif and administratif process. Consequently, public 
policies could be less favourable to environment quality when they are influenced by lobbying 
groups. 
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Theorical arguments show that it’s difficult to predict the impact of democratic institutions on 
environmental quality. Let us now turn to the empirical findings.   
2.2. Empirical results 
Congleton (1992) is one of the earliest scholars who explored the effect of political 
institutions on the willingness of governments to control environment quality. He uses 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions and finds that democratic countries have higher 
methane and Chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) emissions than autocratic countries. He also finds 
that they are more likely to sign the Vienna Convention and the Kyoto Protocol.  
Contrary to him, Barret & Graddy (2000) use panel data (with generalized least squared and 
random effect) and conclude that political and civic freedoms reduce some pollutants (Sulfur 
dioxide) but have no effect on other pollutants (water pollution).  Torras &Boyce (1998), 
using the same data and OLS, also find that political and civic freedoms have a positive effect 
on air and water quality in least developing countries.  Scruggs2 (1998) finds that democracy 
has no effect on environment quality (dissolved oxygen, fecal coliform and particules 
emissions) but increases sulphur dioxide emissions.  
Gleditsch & Sverdrup (2003) run simple bivariate correlations with Polity data and find that 
democracy is harmful for climate gases. Midlarsky (1998) runs multivariate OLS regressions 
and concludes that democracy increases carbon dioxide emissions and deforestation but 
protect land area.  
Li & Reuveny (2006), using a large sample (between 105 and 143 countries), show that 
democracy (continuous and dichotomous variables) reduces environmental degradation 
(carbon dioxide emissions, nitrogen oxide, land degradation, deforestation, organic pollution 
in water). They also indicate that the effect of democracy varies in size accross the five 
environmental indicators.  
Finally, Bernauer & Koubi (2009) test the effects of political institutions on air quality in 42 
countries over the period 1971-1996 and find interesting results. Firstly, democracy has an 
independant positive effect on air quality. Secondly, presidential systems favour 
environmental protection than parliamentary systems.  Thirdly, they show that labor union 
strength reduces the environment protection whereas the green parties improve it. 
A important limitation with these previous studies is that they are interested in the 
effects of political institutions on environmental quality.  None of them explicitly identify 
channel transmissions through the political institutions affect the environmental quality.  
3. Democratic Institutions and environment quality: potential channel transmissions 
In this section, we identify the potential transmission channels between democratic 
institutions and environment quality.  
3.1. Democratic institutions and income inequality  
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 An important caracteristic of democracy is the right to vote. Indeed, an exclusion of an 
important part of population leads to a biais in political leaders’s preferences. Many authors 
assert that an improvement of democratic institutions increases the possiblities of people to 
ask for a better distribution of income (Boix, 1998). As they are democratically elected, 
democratic leaders are incited to adopt redistribution policies such as minimum wage, prices 
subsidy and progressive taxation for the poor and middle classes. In other words, democratic 
process is supposed to reduce income inequality. On the contrary, autocratic leaders will tend 
to adopt policies that are in favour of the elite in powers and maintain consequently, they 
maintain income inequality.  
 Scully (1992) shows that countries where property rights and political openness exist, 
are less inequaliterian than countries where they aren’t implemented. Using a transversal 
analysis for 126 countries over 1960-1998, Gradstein et al. (2001) show that the effect of 
democracy on income inequality depends on ideology that is the dominant religion in the 
country. So in Judeo-Christian societies, democracy is a factor of reduction of income 
inequality while it has no effect in Muslims and Confucian societies. In these countries, equity 
is a social value really important and income transferts are made in an informal way (family 
for example). Muller and Stratmann (2002) show that a high rate participation of citizens in 
the elections, affects the government policies, what tends to reduce income inequality. This 
income inequality reduction is made through income transfers or the size of government 
(spendings).  Reuveny and Li (2003) also conclude that democracies have a positive effect on 
income distribution.  
3.2. Democratic institutions and investments  
In the analysis on the relation between democratic institutions and investments, there are two 
opposing trends. One concludes that democratic institutions reduce investments and the other 
one, they increase them.  
According to Huntington and Dominguez (1975), in democracy, people have to choose 
between consumption and saving, but tend to be in favour of the latter. Indeed, democracy 
allows the median voter to redistribute the revenues in favour of the poor what reduces saving 
and investment. Some authors such as Alesina and Rodrik (1994) think that democracy can 
allow expropriation of physical capital by the median voter if his income is lower than 
average income or if he has greater political rights.  
However this point of view is questionned by other authors who think that political 
institutions favour investments. Firstly, the establishment of a political democratic system 
requires a broad social consensus allowing the political process to be more stable and more 
efficient than autocratic regimes. Economic agents would also be more incited to invest in 
democratic countries than in autocratic countries wherein social consensus is low. Helliwel 
(1994), Pastor and Hilt (1993), Pastor and Sung (1995) conclude that democratic institutions 
have positive effect on private investments.  
Moreover, democratic regimes are also politically stable so they attract investments. In 
political instability, economic agents consume more and reduce saving. Moreover, political 
instability is also a factor of uncertainty because it increases risks and/or perception of 
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investment risks. Its reduces rights and safety of investors. Yi (2001) shows that political 
freedoms increase investments while uncertainty and political instability reduce them.  
4. Empirical Analysis  
4.1. Estimation method and empirical procedure 
4.1.1. Empirical Procedure 
The objective of the paper is to analyse the effect of democratic institutions on 
environment quality and also to identify potential channel transmissions. We think that one 
hand, democratic institutions have direct effect on environment quality and other part, 
indirectly through income inequality and investments.  
Our empirical procedure follows three steps. In first step, we estimate our environmental 
variables carbon dioxide per capita emissions on democratic institutions and control variables 
without channel transmissions. Control variables are from environment economic literature 
and are determinants of carbon dioxide per capita emissions. There are income per capita, 
carbon dioxide per capita at the beginning of period, population growth and trade openness.  
 	
, =  +  + , +  + ,                                    (1) 
With  
, : the average quantity of carbon dioxide per capita (CO2)  and sulfur dioxide per 
capita (SO2) (in ton metric)  in a country (i) at a year t ; ,  are control variables without 
transmission channels;  is our interest variable. The period is 1960 to 2008 and 
data are compiled in five-year averages. Our sample is made of 122 developed and developing 
countries. 
In a second step, we include in the equation (1) the channel transmissions variables allowing 
democratic institutions to affect indirectly environment quality (SO2, CO2). There are income 
inequality and investments.   
	
, =  +  +  ,
 + , +  + ,                                       (2) 
In a last step, we empirically test the effect of democratic institutions on each transmission 
channel.  
 ,
 =  +  +  + ,                                                      (3)  
With   a vector of channel transmissions: income inequality and investments.   
4.1.2. Estimation strategy   
In order to estimate this model we use adequate econometric techniques. The panel 
data take into account transversal, temporal dimensions observed and unobserved 
heterogeneity of countries.  It is inadequate to estimate equations (1) and (2) using 
respectively OLS (Ordinary Least Square), Fixed Effects (FE) and/or Random Effect (RE) 
because the former (OLS) doesn’t take into account unobserved heterogeneity of countries 
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and the latter (FE, RE) is inadequate for dynamic models. Indeed, the dependent variable is 
lagged and endogenous.  We use the GMM-System (Generalized Method of Moment) from 
Arellano-Bond (1991), Arellano-Bover (1995) and Blundell-Bond (1998).  
The GMM-System (Generalized Method of Moment) is a method that estimates a 
system of two equations: one equation in level and the other in first difference.  In the first 
estimate, we use lagged variables in level of at least one period as instruments of the equation 
in first difference. It removes unobserved time invariant and unobserved individual 
characteristics. The conditions to be met are the error terms are uncorrelated and that 
explanatory variables are weakly exogenous. In the second estimate, we use variables in first 
difference lagged of at least one period as instruments of the equation in level.  
To check the validity of results we use the standard Hansen test of over-identifying 
restrictions (where the null hypothesis is that the instrumental variables are not correlated with 
the residual)  and the serial correlation test (AR(2), where the null hypothesis is that the errors 
exhibit no second-order serial correlation).  
4.2. Determinants of environmental quality  
4.2.1. Environmental quality  
In the absence of a single measure of environmental quality, many indicators have been used 
in the literature as proxy for environmental quality. For the purpose of our study, we use two 
pollutants variables. These are carbon dioxide (!"#) per capita and sulfurdioxide ($"#) per 
capita. The choice of CO2 as an environmental indicator is based on two reasons. Firstly, data 
on carbon dioxide emissions are available for longer time-series than any other pollution 
indicator. Secondly, at the global level, CO2 is an immediate cause of greenhouse gas, 
responsible for global warming and climate change. Moreover, carbon dioxide emissions 
contribute to global warming more than any other greenhouse gas. At the domestic level, 
while CO2 by itself does not pose any immediate health hazard to human beings, it is usually 
a by-product of increased industrial activity, which, in the absence of stringent regulation, can 
be a source of toxic emissions and particulates that pose environmental concerns.  
The choice of SO2 as another environmental variable is also based on two arguments. Firstly, 
contrary to carbon dioxide emissions, sulfure dioxide is a local pollutant. It is widely regarded 
as one of the most prominent form of air pollution worldwide, since it has direct and visible 
effects on human health, ecosystems, and the economy ((Konisky, 1999). SO2 has negative 
effects on the human body. It causes acid rain, which damages forests, lakes, buildings, 
cultural objects, and agricultural production. It also reduces visibility, from light mist to dense 
gray smog. Moreover, particles (smoke and soot), sulfur dioxide (SO2), ozone (O3), lead, 
Nitrogen oxides (NO, and NO2, together NOx), and carbon monoxide (CO) constitute the so-
called criteria pollutants. These indicators are used to measure and describe the air quality in a 
country. Secondly, data for SO2 emissions is more reliable than data for other forms of air 
pollution (so-called criteria pollutants), and it is also available for a rather large number of 
countries since the 1970s. Data with similar properties is not available for most other 
environmental quality indicators, such as NOx, VOC, CO, PM, ozone.  
4.2.2. Control variables 
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We refer to the literature on environmental economics and identify determinants of 
environmental quality. There are income per capita, trade openness, population growth and air 
pollution emissions at the beginning of period.  
Carbon dioxide  and Sulfur dioxide emissions per capita at the beginning of period.  
In our opinion, we think that the environment quality (for  example carbon dioxide per capita) 
at the begining of period can be an important determinant of current level of carbon dioxid per 
capita. It takes into account the inertia degree of air pollution and time neccessary to 
implement environment policies or to reduce air pollution.  
Income per capita 
The relation between income per capita and environment quality has been widely studied in 
literature. Income can affect environment quality through the scale of economic activity,  the 
composition (or structure) of economic activity, and  the effect of income on the demand and 
supply of pollution abatement effort.  
The larger the scale of economic activity, all else equal, the higher the level of environmental 
degradation (pollution, resource depletion) is likely to be, since increased economic activity 
results in increased levels of resource use and waste generation, if nothing else changes. Since 
income is acting as an indicator of economic activity, we would expect a positive relationship 
between environmental degradation and income, while controlling for all other income-related 
effects. 
The composition of economic activity affects environmental quality because of the 
differential pollution (and resource-using) intensity of different sectors of the economy. The 
primary sector (agriculture, fisheries, forestry, and mining) tends to be more resource 
intensive than either the secondary (industry) or tertiary (services) sectors. The industry 
(especially manufacturing), on the other hand, tends to be more pollution-intensive than either 
agriculture or services. Since the structure of the economy (sectoral composition of output) 
changes with economic growth, part of the effect of increases in income per capita on 
environmental degradation reflects the effects of changing composition of output.  Since the 
share of industry in GDP first rises with economic growth and then declines as the country 
moves from the pre-industrial to the post-industrial stage of development, we can suppose an 
inverted-U shaped relationship between environmental pollution and income level while 
controlling for all other influences transmitted through income. In other words, in the earlier 
phases of development there is a shift away from agriculture toward heavy industry which 
increases emissions, while in the later stages of development there is a shift from the more 
resource intensive extractive and heavy industrial sectors toward services and lighter 
manufacturing, which supposedly have lower emissions per unit of output. This is 
environmental Kuznets curve (EKC). This hypothese has been validated for some pollutants 
such as sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides (Grossman and Krueger (1995), 
Selden and Song (1994), Shafik (1994), Suri and Chapman (1998) and Bimonte (2002).  For 
other pollutants such as carbon dioxide, results are mixed or contradictory.  Indeed, Holtz-
Eakin  and Selden (1995)  don’t validate the EKC while  Schmalensee et al. (1998) do it. 
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While the generation of pollution is driven by scale and composition of economic activity, the 
abatement of pollution is driven by demand and supply factors both of which are influenced 
by income. On the demand side, at low-income levels, people are more concerned with food 
and other material needs and less concerned with environmental quality. At higher income 
levels, people want higher levels of environmental quality. Selden and Song (1995) think that  
the relationship between income and demand for environmental quality translates into an 
inverted-J curve between income and environmental degradation. In contrast to the inverted 
U-curve relationship of the reduced-form model, the inverted J-curve indicates a non-
increasing relationship between environmental degradation and income once the scale and 
composition of output are controlled for. This is a reflection of the non-negative income 
elasticity of environmental quality which is visible in the J-curve but masked by scale and 
structural factors in the U-curve. On the supply side, low incomes cannot afford countries and 
individuals much expenditure on pollution abatement even if the demand were there. 
Economic growth not only creates the demand for improved environmental quality, but it also 
makes the resources available to supply it. Higher incomes enable higher public expenditures 
on environmental infrastructure as well as environmental regulations that drive private sector 
expenditure on abatement technologies. 
Trade openness 
Grossman and Krueger (1995) decompose the effects of trade on environment into scale, 
technical and composition effects. The scale effect of trade measures the negative 
environmental consequences of scalar increases in economic activity. The technical effect is 
the positive environmental consequences of increases in income that call for cleaner 
production methods. The composition effect can have a positive or negative impact on the 
environment because it measures the evolution the economy towards a more or less 
appropriate productive structure. Thus, Antweiler and Al (2001) conclude that trade reduced 
emissions of pollution of 43 countries over the period 1971-1996. Frankel and Rose (2005) 
also conclude that trade is favourable to the reduction of pollution. However, other authors 
such as Managi (2004) conclude that trade has a negative impact on carbon dioxide emissions. 
Population growth 
Many authors analyse the effect of growth and the level of population on environment quality. 
According to National Academy of science (NAS, 1992), “The more people there are in the 
world, the greater is the demand put on resources to provide food, energy, clothing and shelter 
for them. All these activities necessarily involve emissions of greenhouse gases”. Newell & 
Marcus show there is a ‘‘nearly perfect’’ correlation (99,8%) between world population 
growth and growing concentration of carbon dioxide over the period 1958-1983. Holdren 
(1991) and Harisson (1994) use mathematical formula to find a contribution of population 
growth to greenhouse gas emissions. They conclude that population growth is responsible for 
40% (36%) of the increase in energy consumption (annual emissions growth) respectively. 
However Lutz (1993) found that population growth has a small role in industrial carbon 
dioxide emissions. They also show that population growth rate has a positive effect on 
pollution. 
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4.2.3. Transmission channels variables 
Investments 
According to Brock&Taylor (2004), a high investment rate leads to high physical capital 
stock at regular state and increases carbon dioxide per capita emissions during transitional 
dynamic. Investments are the motor of economic growth. Foreign and domestic investments 
allow countries to access international markets, trade, new technologies and competences. 
However these opportunities can differ with countries development.  
In some countries, investments are directed towards building, services and manufacturing 
sectors. In other countries, they are directed towards natural resource sectors in particular, oil 
firms, wood companies, big consumers of energy and thus pollutants. For example in Africa, 
65% of direct foreign investments go to the natural resources sector. The expected effects are 
a rise of employment, a rise of taxes, a rise of revenues for the states and the reduction of 
poverty.  These countries can also be less sensitive to environmental problems. In the same 
way, the weakness of infrastructures, particularly roads, strongly increases the use of energy 
and consumption of polluting resources. 
Income inequality 
Many scholars such as Boyce (1994), Marsiliani& Renström (2000), Borghesi (2000) have 
analysed the effect of income inequality on environment quality. Some authors conclude that 
income inequality favours environment protection whereas others find negative effect. 
Firstly Boyce (1994) develops theorical arguments that income inequaliy increases 
environment degradation through the rate of time preference and the benefit-cost analysis of 
environmentally degrading activities. As to the first point, Boyce (1994) thinks that income 
inequality reduces awarness of environment quality for both rich and poor. The poor would 
overexploit natural and environmental resources because of survival motivation. Similarly, 
rich people will not also protect the environment quality. Income inequality increases and 
exacerbates conflicts in income distribution and political instability. The polarization of 
resources and incomes causes violence and social trouble. This leads rich people to prefer a 
policy of overexploiting the environment and natural resources and investing the returns 
abroad.  
Secondly, political power is highly correlated to income inequality. Rich people are likely to 
have political power and to influence environmental policies. The implementations of 
environmental policies are based on cost-benefit analysis, the competition between people 
who benefit from the environment destruction and those who bear the cost of it. Therefore 
Boyce (1994) concludes that income inequality affects the distribution of power and allows 
people who benefit from activities that degrade the environment (the rich) to impose 
environmental cost on the losers.  
Thirdly, Borghesi (2000) argues that the implementation of environmental policies is likely 
with social consensus. It is easier to get this consensus  in an equal society  that in an unequal 
society with conflicts among political agents and social instability.  
Several empirical studies have found that income inequality degrades environmental quality. 
Magnani (2000) finds that reductions in pollution are more likely if a country's economic 
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growth is accompanied by improvements in income equality. In a study of tropical countries, 
Koop and Tole (2001) conclude that inequalities of income and landownership tend to 
exacerbate deforestation. Mikkelson et al. (2007) and Holland et al. (2009) find income 
inequality to be a statistically significant predictor of biodiversity loss.  
However other scholars think that income inequality may have no effect or improve 
environment quality.  
Firstly Ravallion et al.(2000) claim that the impact of income distribution on environmental 
degradation depends on the marginal propensity to emit (MPE). According to them, each 
agent has an implicit demand function for air pollution (carbon dioxide) since the 
consumption of every good pollute the environment quality either directly (via consumption) 
or indirectly (via its production).  If the poor have a higher (lower) MPE than the rich a 
reduction of income inequality will increase (reduce) pollution emissions respectively. One 
can’t say a priori which of these two effects will happen. On the one hand, the poor may 
consume goods with more pollution than the rich. On the other hand they can use energy more 
efficiently than the rich. Therefore the effect of income inequality is not clear and depends on 
whether the marginal propensity to emit increases or decreases as income grows. In other 
words it depends on the second derivative of the pollution-income function.  
Secondly, Boyce (2003) shows that income distribution affects the demand for environmental 
quality. At any given level of average income, an increase in income inequality means the rich 
become more rich and the poor more poor. He supposes that the environment is a normal 
good and the income elasticity of demand for environmental quality is positive. An increase in 
income inequality increases the demand for environmental quality of the rich and decreases 
the demand of the poor.  The net effect on demand for environmental quality is ambigious and 
is function of the shape of the demand-income relation. If the relation is linear or demand for 
environmental quality increases with income at a constant rate, an increase in income 
inequality will have no effect on the demand for environmental quality. If the demand-income 
relation is convex (concave) income inequality reduces (improves) environmental quality.  
  
4. 3. Overview of the Data  
The time period under study is 1960-2008 for 122 developed and developing countries. Our 
panel data are time period corresponding to five-year averages (1960-1964, 1965-1969,…). 
The data on carbon dioxide per capita, investments, trade openness, population growth and 
income per capita are from World Development Indicators (2008). Those on democratic 
institutions, income inequality and sulfure dioxide per capita come respectively from Polity 
IV (2008), Texas Inequality Project (UTIP 2008) database and  David Stern (2004).  
The carbon dioxide per capita emissions are measured in metric ton per capita and are 
estimated from the combustion of fossil energies, cement industries in the liquid, solid or gas 
form. Trade openness and investment correspond respectively to the share of the sum of 
(exports and imports) and investments in gross domestic product (GDP).  
As democratic institutions, we chose the index of polity(2), which is a score obtained by 
differencing of the index of democracy and index of autocracy on a scale going from +10 
(democracy) to -10 (autocracy). The indicator of democracy is characterized by the effective 
existence of institutional rules framing of the power and the presence of institutions enabling 
citizens to express their expectations and choose political elites. The autocracy is 
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characterized by the absence or the restriction of political competition, economic planning and 
control. The exercise of the power is slightly constrained by institutions and the leaders are 
only selected within a “political elite”. 
Income inequality is a GINI coefficient. It comes from Texas Inequality Project (UTIP 2008) 
database. We use EHII (Estimated Household Income Inequality) variable that is an index 
ranging from 0 (no inequality) to 1 (perfect inequality) and is based on database of Deninger 
and Squire (D&S) and UTIP-UNIDO.  
The first column of tables (1a &1b) correlates environment variables (carbon dioxide per 
capita and sulfure dioxide per capita) with the explicative variables such as democratic 
institutions, income inequality, investments, income per capita, population growth and trade. 
The signs of these correlations are consistent with our priors. For example carbon dioxide per 
capita emissions are positively correlated with investments, democratic institutions and 
negatively with income inequality, income per capita and population. The second column 
(table1a) contains the correlations between democratic institutions and variables such as 
channel transmissions (income inequality and investments). Analysing the democratic 
institutions- channel and channel –carbon dioxide per capita correlations together (column 1 
& 2, table 1a), we have an outline of the direction of channel effects. Indeed democratic 
institutions are positively correlated with investments and investments are positively 
correlated with carbon dioxide per capita implying that democratic institutions is positively 
correlated with carbon dioxid per capita positively through investment. The same analysis can 
be made with income inequality. We find similar conclusions for sulfur dioxide per capita 
emissions in table 1b. However to confirm or reject correlation results, it is better to estimate 
our equations and control for other determinants of environment quality.  
[Table 1a &1b] 
4.4. Résults 
Column (1) of table (4a &4b) shows results of equation (1) estimated by GMM-System. An 
improvement of democratic institutions contributes to a reduction of carbon dioxide emissions 
per capita and sulfur dioxide emissions per capita. The effect is -0,015 (-0,027) and significant 
at 5% (1%) respectively for  and  . These results are similar to Gleditsch & Sverdrup 
(2003), Li & Reveuny (2006) and Bernauer & Koubi (2009) who conclude that democratic 
institutions improve environment quality.   
The next coulumns of Table (4a &4b) show results of equation (2) estimated by GMM-
System. We estimate the effect of democratic institutions on environment quality emissions 
and we include control the transmission channels: investments and income inequality.  
 
[Table4a &Table4b] 
In column (2) of table (4a&4b), we include invesments in regression. We find that 
investments have a positive and significant effect on carbon dioxide emissions per capita and 
sulfur dioxide emissions per capita. Indeed, an increase in investments of 1% contributes to 
carbon dioxide emissions per capita by 0,80% and sulfur dioxide emissions per capita by 
0,18% respectively. Investments can be considered as an important factor of air pollution.  
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In column (3) of table (4a&4b), we include only income unequality in regression.  We think 
that there would be an endogeneity between environmental quality and income inequality. 
According to Arrow et al. (1995), economic activity depends on the environmental resource 
base. High and imprudent use of the environmental resource base may reduce the capacity for 
generating material production and income in the future. The environmental resource base 
includes assimilative capacities for waste discharges.Secondly, the poorest are vulnerable to 
environmental degradation since they depend heavily on natural resources and have less 
alternative resource. They are also exposed to environment hazards and are less capable of 
coping to environmental risks (Dagusta and Mäler, 1994; World Bank, DFID, EC, UNDP, 
2002). Furthermore, the rich are more capable of looking after themselves from 
environmental diseases than the poorest. An increase in environment degradation would affect 
more the incomes of the poor than the rich and increase the income inequality.To solve the 
problem of endogeneity, we use GMM-System allowing us to instrument income inequality 
with lagged variables. Result indicates that an increase of income inequality reduces air 
pollution emissions (carbon dioxide per capita and sulfur dioxide per capita). Income 
inequality favours environment protection.  These results are also similar to scholars 
(Ravallion et al.(2000))  who claim that income inequality may have improve environment 
quality.  
The inclusion of investments and income inequality in regression (column (4) of table 
(4a & 4b) improve the magnitude and the significance of the coefficients of democratic 
institutions on environment quality. The final regression indicates the effect of democratic 
institutions, transmission channels (investments and income inequality) and control variables 
on air pollution. The coefficient on democratic institutions indicates the direct effect on 
environment quality. Moreover, an increase of magnitude and coefficient of democratic 
institutions (column (1) to column (4)) would indicate that they may have a partial effect 
through investments and incomeinequality. It would also be very important and interesting to 
test the existence of these two potential channel transmissions. 
 
4.4.1. Effect of democratic institutions on channel transmissions 
Our results seem to indicate that democratic institutions may have both direct and indirect 
effects through income inequality and investments on environment quality. In this section, we 
test the existence of these two channel transmissions. In equation (3.a & 3.b) respectively, we 
estimate democratic institutions on income inequality and investments.  
%&
 
'()*, =  + +, +  +  , + ,   (3.a) 
 ,
&
 -(
, =  + ,  +  , +  + ,    (3.b) 
with , : income per capita, population growth and trade openness. 
[Table5] 
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Column (1) of table (5) shows result of equation (3.a) estimated with fixed effects  (FE) 
method. Democratic institutions have a positive effect on investments. Our results are similar 
with Yi (2001) who conclude that political freedoms (democratic freedoms) attract 
investments.  
Similarly, column (2) shows results of equation (3.b) estimated with fixed effects  (FE). 
Result shows that democratic institutions have a positive effect on income inequality. 
However we suspect an inverse relation (endogeneity problem) between income inequality 
and democratic institutions. Firstly, income inequality increases and exacerbates conflicts in 
income distribution and politicalinstability. The polarization of resources and incomes causes 
violence and social trouble. This situation can allow illegal activities, protest movements and 
coup d’Etat (Figueroa, 1996).  Secondly, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) show that income 
inequality reduce strongly the consolidation of democracies. One argument is that it facilitates 
and allows a redistribution of incomes in favour of the poors and defavour of richs in power. 
The burden of democracy on the elites is increasing in the income gap between them and 
citizens. They would have an incitative to destabilize democracy. Latin America is an 
example wherein income inequalities do not allow democracy to consolidate. Estimation 
results are biaised. To solve the problem of endogeneity, we use GMM-System allowing us to 
instrumente democratic institutions with lagged variables.  
Column (3) concludes that democratic institutions reduce income inequality. Thus democracy 
allows the poor to get more resources through income redistribution.Result is similar with 
authors such as Boix (1998), Muller and Stratmann (2002).  Muller and Stratmann (2002) 
show that a better participation of citizens in elections (from 40% to 80%) reduces income 
inequality (Gini Index) in 10%. The reduction of income inequality is explained by income 
transfers or by government size (expenditure).  
Results indicate that democratic institutions have a positive (negative) effect on investments 
and income inequality respectively. Democratic institutions also affect environment quality 
indirectly through investments and income inequality.   
Indeed, democratic institutions attract investments that hurt environment quality 
(carbon dioxide emissions per capita and sulfur dioxide emissions per capita). We can 
conclude that democratic institutions increase air pollution through investments. Similarly, 
democratic institutions hurt environment quality because they reduce income inequality. Then 
democratic institutions have opposite effect on environment quality: a positive direct effect on 
environment quality and negative indirect effects through investments and income inequality. 
In other words, on one hand democratic institutions improve environment quality and other 
part, they hurt it through income inequality and investments. 
 
4.4.2. The importance of economic development 
An important characteristic of democratic institutions is that their levels are different 
according to economic development. Table (6) shows that the level of democratic institutions 
is higher in developed countries (6.95) than in developing countries (-1.37).   
[Table6] 
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Our results indicate that democratic institutions have a positive direct on environment quality. 
The question is that these results may be biaised and explained by the quality of democratic 
institutions in developed countries?  To answer this question, we distinguish two groups of 
countries that are developing countries and developed countries and analyse the effect of 
democratic insitutions on environment quality. The results shown in columns (1) and (2) of 
table (7) indicate that democratic institutions in both groups have a direct positive effect on 
environment quality. More interesting, the direct effect of democratic institutions on 
environment quality in developed countries is higher than in developing countries. This can 
be explained by the fact that the quality of democratic institutions is better in developed 
countries than in developing countries.  
Another result is that the direct positif effect of democratic institutions is higher for sulfur 
dioxide per capita than for carbon dioxide per capita in developed countries and in developing 
countries. These results can be explained by the fact that sulfur dioxide emissions are a local 
pollutant contrary to carbon dioxide that is a global pollutant. 
[Table7] 
4.4.3. The form of democratic system 
We find that democratic institutions have a direct positive effect on air quality. In democratic 
institutions there are different forms of gouvernment: presidential and parliamentary.  Does 
the form of democratic gouvernment affect environment quality?  Indeed recent research on 
the provision of public goods such as environment argues that the form of government in 
democratic political systems is an important factor.  Persson et al. (2000) think that 
presidential system would underproduce public goods because legislative coalitions are 
unstable and leaders promote the allocation of spending to powerfull minorities. 
Parliamentary system would increase spending on public goods and satisfy the majority of 
voters.  However, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) develop selectorate theory and show that 
presidential system would produce more public goods (prosperity, peace, transparency, 
political rights, and civil liberties) than parliamentary system. Results are mixed for public 
goods such as education, health care, social security, and foreign policy.  Bernauer & Koubi 
(2008) also find that presidential system reduce sulfur dioxide emissions more than 
parliamentarysystem. We include in our analysis an index of the type of democratic system. It 
is a trichotomous variable that takes the value of 0 for presidential democracies; 1 for 
assembly-elected president democracies and 2 for parliamentary democracies. 
[Table8] 
Results (columns 2 & 4, table8) indicate that the form of democratic system have no effect on 
environment quality (carbon dioxid per capita and sulfur dioxide per capita). In other words 
the nature of democratic institutions has no effect on the environment quality. 
 
4.4.3. Sensitivity analysis 
4.4.3.1. The environmental kuznets curve 
Most previous papers in the environmental Kuznets curve (ekc) assume that environmental 
quality is a polynomial function of income per capita. In our paper, we have chosen a linear 
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relation between income per capita and environmental quality.  However, as choice of the 
functional form, some authors estimate environmental degradation as a quadratic function of 
income per capita. We test the existence of environmental Kuznets curve by including the 
squared income per capita. Results (column 1&3 of table 8) conclude that the hypothese3 of 
environmental Kuznets curve isn’t verified.     
4.4.3.2. Econometric method 
For estimations, we used one-step Generalized Method of Moments (GMM-system). We re-
estimate our equations using two step GMM-system because two step GMM-system estimator 
is more efficient than one-step GMM-system estimator even if their standards errors can be 
severly downward biaised in small sample. This potential biais is solved by the method of 
correction (Windmeijer (2005)) of covariance matrice in finite sample. Results are in tables 9a 
&9b. We note that results are similar with those obtained by one-step GMM estimator and are 
robust.  
[Table 9a &9b] 
Democratic institutions have opposite effect on environment quality: a positive direct effect 
on environment quality and negative indirect effects through investments and income 
inequality. In other words, on one hand democratic institutions improve environment quality 
and other part, they hurt it through income inequality and investments. 
4.4.3.4. Alternative empirical strategy: the residuals generated regressors 
We use another empirical strategy to analyse the effect and transmission channels of 
democratic institutions on environment quality. We apply the approach of the residuals 
generated regressors (Gomanee et al.(2005) to test if income inequality and investments are 
robust transmission channels of democratic institutions on environmental quality. Our 
empirical procedure also follows three steps.  
In first step, we estimate a basic specification of environmental quality on democratic 
institutions, transmission channels (investments (,,), Income inequality (
',)) and 
control variables.  
	
, =  +  +  ,
 + , +  + ,                      (4.a) 
 ,: Income per capita, carbon dioxide per capita at the beginning of period, population 
growth, trade openness and ,
 
:  investments (,,), Income inequality (
',).  
 Secondly, we empirically test the effect of democratic institutions on each transmission 
channel and run a bivariate regression between the transmission variables (investments 
(,,), Income inequality (
',)) and democratic institutions. 
TC  = Ω +  4                                         (4.b) 
                                                           
3
 Others authors (Grossman and Krueger (1994), Sha…k (1994), Grossman (1995), Torras &Boyce (1998)) have 
found that for some environmental variables the environment income relationship may be better described by a 
cubic function of income per capita. In others words environmental degradation first increases, then decreases 
and finally rises again. We also test the cubic function of income per capita but results are similar to quadratic 
form of income per capita. Results are available upon request.   
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Where the coefficient  Ω gives a measure of the strength of the relation between the channel 
transmission and democratic institutions and K, representating the part of transmission 
channel (investments or income inequality) that is not attributed to democratic institutions.  
In equation (4.a), we have both democratic institutions and transmission channels. If 
democratic institutions affect the transmission variables and if democratic institutions and the 
transmissions variables are determinants of environmental quality, thus the coefficient of 
democratic institutions,, is an estimate of a direct effect on environmental quality while the  
coefficient of the transmission channel variable, ,  gives an estimate of the effect on 
transmission channel on environmental quality –including the effect of democratic institutions 
on environmental quality via each transmission channel. To be able to check if democratic 
institutions have direct and indirect effects on environmental quality, we need to purge for 
transmission channel induced by democratic institutions.  
From equation (3.b), we construct the residual estimates ( , res) of each trasmission 
channel (investments (Invres) and income inequality (Ineqres)). These are the part of 
transmission channel (investments or income inequality) that is not attributed to democratic 
institutions. Thirdly, we substitute  ,
 
res (Invres, Ineqres) for  ,  (Invesments, Income 
inequality) respectively in the basic equation (4a). We have:  
	
, =  + ( +  Ω ∗ )  +  ,
 res + , +  + ,     (4.c) 
This transformation will affect only the coefficient on the democratic institutions variables.   
In cases where the ‘‘transmission’’ variable has a positive effect on explained variable 
(	
,) and democratic institutions has a negative effect on the ‘‘transmission’’ variable, 
this method will provide for  a lower coefficient on democratic institutions. If the variable has 
a negative on 	
, and democratic institutions are a positive determinant of the 
transmission variable, the coefficient on democratic institutions will increase.  If democratic 
institutions is not a determinant of ‘‘transmission variable’’ there is no effect and this method 
is not used.  
Columns (2, 4 and 6) of table10 (a&b) present the estimation results of equation (4.c) with the 
generated regressor (Invres and Ineqres).  Results indicate that Invres (the part of investments 
that is not attributed  to democratic institutions) and Ineqres (the part of income inequality that 
is not attributed  to democratic institutions)  are  determinants of environment quality.  A 
comparaison of columns (1) and (2) of tables 10a&b indicate that the coefficient on 
democratic institutions reduce (from -0.123 to -0.119) when we substitute Invres for 
Investment. This reduction allows us to conclude that the coefficient on democratic 
institutions (column (2)) capt its direct effect on environment quality and the indirect effect 
through investments. In other words, investments are a transmission channel of democratic 
institutions. Conclusions are similar for income inequality.  
5. Conclusion 
This paper aims at analysing the effect of democratic institutions on environment 
quality and at identifying channel transmissions. The main contribution of this paper is that 
we identify and test some channels by which democratic institutions affect the environment 
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quality. We identify and test two transmission channels : income inequality and investments. 
We use panel data from 1960 to 2008 for 122 countries and modern econometric methods that 
are one-step GMM-System, two-step GMM-System one step, fixed effect estimators and the 
residuals generated regressors. The results are as follows: Firstly, we show that democratic 
institutions have opposite effects on environment quality: a positive direct effect on 
environment quality and a negative indirect effect through investments and income inequality. 
 Indeed, democratic institutions attract investments that hurt environment quality. Similarly, 
democratic institutions hurt environment quality because they reduce income inequality. 
Secondly, we find that the direct negative effect of democratic institutions is higher for local 
pollutant (SO2) than for global pollutant (CO2). Thirdly, the nature of democratic institutions 
(presidential, parliamentary) is not conducive to environmental quality. Fourtly, results 
suggest that the direct positive effect of democratic institutions on environment quality is 
higher in developed countries than in developing countries. Thus, the democratic process in 
the first group of countries has increased their awareness for the environment protection. 
Results are robust with alternative econometric methods such as two-step GMM-system, the 
approach of residuals generated regressors and the inclusion of variables such as income per 
capita squared, the form of democratic government. The positive effect of democratic 
institutions shows that they allow people to more conscious of environmental problems. 
Democratic institutions are also responsive to the demand of people by reducing income 
inequality and increasing investments that favour economic growth. The negative effect on 
environment quality through income inequality and investments put highlights some 
importants factors explaining free riding behaviour of some democratic countries. Our 
empirical analysis also indicates that democracy don’t “works” through the form of 
democratic system: controlling for the form of democratic government, democratic 
institutions always have a direct positive impact on environment quality. Our results suggest 
policy implications. They suggest that an improvement of democratization process in 
countries (specially developing countries) allowing a high awareness of people. Countries 
should also find ways to reduce the indirect negative impact of democratic institutions on 
environment quality (for example the implementation of ecologically appropriate 
investments).  
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List of countries included in the sample 
Albania,Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Burundi, 
Benin, Bangladesh, Burkina-Faso, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Bahrain, Bolivia, Brazil, Botswana, 
Canada, Central Africa, Chile, China, Cote d’Ivoire, Cameroun, Congo, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark,  Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Spain, France, Finland, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Haiti, 
Holland, Hungary, Indonesia, India, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, 
Korea, Kuwait, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Lesotho, Lithuania, Macedonia, 
Mexico,Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Malawi, Malaysia,Morocco, Moldovia, Mongolia, 
Mozambique, Myanmar,  Nigeria, Netherland, New Zealand, Niger, Nicaragua, Nepal, 
Norway, Pakistan,Panama, Peru, Philippines, New Guinea, Guinea, Poland, Portugal, 
Paraguay, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sri 
Lanka, Sierra Leone, El Salvador, Sudan, Syria, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Togo, 
Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, the USA, 
Uruguay,Venezuela, South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
Table 1a : Correlation matrix for explicatives variables and Carbon dioxide per capita 
 C02/ 
capita 
Democratic 
Institutions 
Income Inequality Investment Income
/capita 
Population Trade 
C02/ capita 1.0000       
Democratic 
Institutions 
0.2787 1.0000      
Income 
Inequality 
-0.2577       -0.3898 1.0000     
Investment  0.1153 0.0492      -0.2643        1.0000    
Income/ 
capita 
-0.0050          -0.0235 -0.0256 0.2497 1.0000   
Population -0.1364 -0.5537 0.4609 -0.1123 -0.0255 1.0000  
Trade  0.1468 0.0406       -0.0338         0.2648      -0.0742    -0.0922    1.0000 
Source : Author 
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Table 1b : Correlation matrix for explicatives variables and sulfur dioxide per capita 
 S02/ 
capita 
Democratic 
Institutions 
Income Inequality Investment Income
/capita 
Population Trade 
S02/ capita 1.0000       
Democratic 
Institutions 
0.0832 1.0000      
Income 
Inequality 
-0.1521       -0.3834 1.0000     
Investment  0.0787 0.0531      -0.2819        1.0000    
Income/ 
capita 
-0.0211          -0.0324 -0.0256 0.2593 1.0000   
Population -0.0121 -0.5690 0.4855 -0.1230 -0.0344 1.0000  
Trade  0.1034 0.0282       -0.0295         0.2738      -0.0725    -0.0340    1.0000 
Source : Author 
Table2: Papers studying the effect of democracy on environment quality 
Authors Environment indicators Results Sample 
 
Congleton (1992) 
 
Methane per capita 
 
+ 118 countries for 
1989 
 CFC  per capita  
 
+ 
 
 
 
 
 
Midlarsky (1998) 
 
CO2  per capita  + 98 countries i for 
1990 
 
 soil erosion by water 
 
+ 97 countries for the 
1980s, 
% of annual deforestation 
 
+ 77 countries from 
1981 to 1990   
% of protected  
land area   
+ 100 countries in 1993 
 
freshwater availability 
 
No effect  97 countries in 1990  
 the level of soil erosion 
by chemicals 
 
No effect 97 countries during 
the 1980s. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Barrett & Graddy 
(2000) 
 
 sulfur dioxide per capita 
 
- a pooled 
sample of countries 
for about 33 years 
   
water pollution No effect  45 countries for 
about 29 years. 
 
 
 
 
 
Torras and 
Boyce (1998) 
 Air pollution (SO2, 
smoke, particulate 
emissions) 
 
-  Samples of 19–42 
countries from 1977 
to 1991 
 
Water pollution 
(dissolved oxygen, fecal 
- 58 countries from 
1977 to 1991  
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coliform, 
access to safe water, and 
access to sanitation)  
 
 
Scruggs (1998) 
 water pollution and 
particulate emissions 
 
No effect 148–185 sites in 24 
countries three 
periods (1979–1982, 
1983–1986, and 
1987–1990) 
 
SO2 emissions 
-  
Gleditsch and 
Sverdrup (2003) 
 CO2 per capita 
 
- 108 countries in 1990 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Li & Reveuny 
(2006) 
 
 land degradation 
 
-  105 countries in the 
1980s. 
 
Carbon dioxide 
emissions 
- 143 countries from 
1961 to 1997 
   
 NOx emissions - 118countries in 1990, 
time series cross 
sectional  
Bernauer & 
Koubi (2009)  
 
sulfur dioxide (SO2) 
concentrations  
- 42 countries from 
1971 to 1996 
 
Table3: Descriptive statistics 
 Average Standard dev Min Max 
 Carbon dioxide per capita  4,04 6,69 0 76,16 
Democratic Institutions 0 ,32 7,33 -10 10 
Investment rate 21,37  2,53 86,79 
Income Inequality 41,58 6,67 21.82 62,32 
Trade openness 67,83  2,35 466,31 
Population growth rate 1,87 1,54 -20,36 11,80 
Income per capita 5147,74 7842,89 83,50 53653.35 
Source: WDI (2008), Polity IV, University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP) database 
(2008) and author 
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Table4a : Effect of democratic institutions on environment quality 
Log of carbon dioxide emissions per 
capita (One step GMM-System) 
    (1)   (2)     (3)      (4) 
 
Log of initial carbon dioxide  
per capita 
 
0.936 
(5.09)*** 
 
0.826 
(13.67)*** 
 
0.820 
(11.13)*** 
 
 
0.902 
(20.45)*** 
Log of Democratic Institutions   -0.015 
(2.01)** 
-0.123 
(1.83)* 
 
-0.144 
(2.15)** 
-0.195 
(2.03)** 
Log of income per capita 0.01 
(0.14) 
0.005 
(0.63) 
-0.005 
(0.34) 
-0.019 
(2.10)** 
 
Population growth 
 
-0.015 
 (0.42) 
 
-0.044 
(1.36) 
 
-0.036 
(0.79) 
 
-0.025 
(0.67) 
 
Log of Trade openness 
  
 
0.08 
(1.13)* 
 
0.055 
(0.36) 
 
0.261 
(2.39)** 
 
0.12 
(1.02) 
 
Log of  investment 
 
0.494 
(2.97)*** 
 
 
 
 
0.50 
(2.85)*** 
Income Inequality    -0.032 
(3.66)*** 
-0.021 
(2.32)** 
 
Constant 
 
0.23 
 
-1.237 
 
0.840 
 
-0.25 
 (0.90) (1.63) (1.72)* (0.30) 
Observations 887 823 
 
608 577 
Number of countries  122 143 120 117 
 
AR (1) 
 
0.001 
 
0.01 
 
0.001 
 
0.01 
 
AR(2) 
 
0.464 
 
0.92 
 
0.13 
 
0.10 
 
Hansen Test 
 
 
0.18 
 
0.44 
 
0.11 
 
0.29 
Number of instruments  12 15 19 17 
NB: * significatif at10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. The study period is 1960-2008. Temporal dummies are 
included. 
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Table4b: Effect of democratic institutions on environment quality 
Log of sulfure dioxide emissions per 
capita (One step GMM-System) 
    (1)   (2)     (3)      (4) 
Log of initial sulfur dioxide per 
capita 
0.865 0.991 0.852 0.879 
 
(6.86)*** (7.06)*** (32.00)*** (11.33)*** 
 
Log of Democratic Institutions   
 
-0.029 
 
-0.203 
 
-0.063 
 
-0.268 
 
(3.20)*** (2.59)** (2.00)** (2.07)** 
 
Log of income per capita 
 
0.006 
 
0.003 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.012 
 
(1.10) (0.49) (0.26) (1.31) 
 
 Population growth 
 
-0.054 
 
-0.016 
 
-0.015 
 
-0.073 
 
(1.21) (0.31) (0.61) (1.40) 
 
Log of Trade openness 
 
0.865 
 
-0.056 
 
0.050 
 
-0.031 
 
(6.86)*** (0.74) (1.28) (0.71) 
 
Log of  investment 
 
 
0.183 
  
0.187 
  
(2.97)*** 
 (1.87)* 
 
Income Inequality  
  
 
-0.01 
 
-0.019 
   
(2.11)** (1.69)* 
 
Constant 
 
-1.797 
 
0.030 
 
-1.447 
 
-1.520 
 
(1.06) (0.02) (3.67)*** (1.16) 
 
Observations 
 
813 
 
751 
 
577 
 
548 
Number of countries  115 115 104 101 
AR (1) 0,02 0,01 0,03 0,05 
AR(2) 0 ,24 0,15 0,21 0,24 
Hansen Test 0,12 0,24 0,11 0,13 
Number of instruments  20 19 11 26 
NB: * significatif at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. The study period is 1960-2008. Temporal dummies 
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Table 5: Democratic Institutions and channel transmissions  
      Log of   
investment   
       Income Inequality 
   (1) FE   (2)  FE (3) 
GMM System  
 
Log of Democratic Institutions   
  
0.037 
  
0.380 
 
-1,29 
 
 (1.90)*  (1.26)* (-2,31)** 
 
Log of income per capita 
  
0.075 
  
-2.274 
 
-0,385 
 
 (1.81)*  (3.51)*** (2.19)** 
 
 Population growth 
  
0.059 
  
-0.047 
 
1.760 
 
 (3.24)***  (0.23) (4.18)*** 
 
Log of Trade openness 
  
0.290 
  
0.529 
 
4.978 
 
 (7.09)***  (0.85) (1.73)* 
 
Constant 
  
1.014 
  
60.348 
 
25.297 
 
 
 (2.50)**  (10.22)*** (2.12)** 
 
R-squared 
  
0.15 
  
0.25 
 
 
Observations 
  
662 
  
663 
 
663 
 
Number of countries 
  
122 
  
122 
 
122 
 
AR (1) 
     
0,18 
 
AR(2) 
     
0,23 
 
Test Hansen 
 
Numberof instruments 
 
     
0,13 
 
11 
 
NB: * significatif at10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. The study period is 1960-2008. Dummy variables  
are included. 
Table 6: Difference of democratic institutions according to economic development   
Democratic Institutions Mean mini max S D 
Whole sample 
 
0.32 -10 10 7.33 
Developing countries -1.37 -10 10 6.65 
 
Developed countries 
 
6.95 
 
-10 
 
10 
 
6.01 
    Source: Polity IV and author 
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Table (7): Effect of democratic institutions on environment quality according to 
economic development 
Dependent variables (One step 
GMM-System) 
 
Log of carbon dioxide per 
capita 
 
Log of sulfur  dioxide per 
capita 
    
 Developing 
Countries  
(1) 
Developed 
Countries 
(2) 
Developing 
Countries  
       (3) 
 
  Developed 
Countries  
      (4) 
Log of intial  carbon dioxide  
per capita 
0.836 
(15.06)*** 
1.056 
5.21)*** 
  
 
Log of initial sulfurdioxide per 
capita 
 
Log of Democratic Institutions   
 
 
 
 
-0.189 
 
 
 
 
-0.252 
 
0.864 
(31.73)*** 
 
-0.207 
 
0.848 
(16.48)*** 
 
-0.543 
 1.92)** (3.92)*** (2.19)** (2.79)** 
 
Log of income per capita 
 
-0.020 
 
-0.017 
 
-0.011 
 
-0.045 
 (1.54) (0.52) (1.10) (1.19) 
 
Population growth 
 
-0.049 
 
-0.080 
 
-0.027 
 
-0.087 
 (1.68)* (1.72)* (0.73) (1.01) 
 
Log of Trade openness 
 
0.227 
 
-0.321 
 
0.055 
 
-0.159 
 (1.61) (1.56) (1.02) (2.12)** 
 
Log of  investment 
 
0.553 
 
0.698 
 
0.187 
 
0.282 
 (2.57)** (2.47)** (1.87)* (1.82)* 
 
Income inequality  
 
-0.011 
 
-0.018 
 
-0.019 
 
-0.013 
 (2.22)** (1.70)* (1.69)* (0.89) 
 
Constant 
 
-1.231 
(1.30) 
 
 
-0.571 
(0.76) 
 
 
-0.942 
(1.34) 
 
 
0.591 
(0.68) 
 
Observations 
 
406 
 
171 
 
380 
 
168 
Number of codepays 90 27 76 25 
AR(1) 0.001 0.09 0.0 3 0.22 
AR(2) 0,13 0.32 0.47 0.26 
Hansen Test 0,44 0.70 0.60 0.31 
Number of instruments 17 17 18 17 
NB: * significatif at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. The study period is 1960-2008. Temporal dummies are included. 
 
 
 30 
Table (8) : Effect on democratic institutions on environment quality  
Dependent variables Log of carbon dioxide per capita 
 
Log ofsulfur dioxide per capita 
    
(One step GMM-
System) 
 
           (1) (2)              (3)          (4) 
Log of initial carbon 
dioxide per capita 
0.905 
20.01)*** 
0.887 
(20.45)*** 
 
 
 
Log of initial sulfur 
dioxide per capita 
  
 
0.881 
(11.36)*** 
 
0.887 
(20.45)*** 
 
Log of Democratic 
Institutions  
 
 
-0.204 
(2.16)** 
 
 
-0.152 
(2.17)** 
 
-0.270 
(2.08)** 
 
-0.241 
(2.64)*** 
Log of income per 
capita 
-0.047 
(1.90)* 
-0.015 
(1.90)* 
-0.018 
(0.42) 
-0.019 
(1.67)* 
 
Population growth 
 
-0.028 
 
-0.016 
 
-0.073 
 
-0.096 
 (0.73) (0.64) (1.41) (1.74)* 
 
Log of Trade 
openness 
 
0.106 
(0.93) 
 
0.083 
(0.82) 
 
-0.031 
(0.68) 
 
-0.046 
(0.91) 
 
Log of  investment 
 
0.491 
 
0.494 
 
0.351 
 
0.458 
 (2.81)*** (3.15)*** (3.75)*** (3.99)*** 
 
Income inequality  
 
-0.021 
 
-0.018 
 
0.001 
 
0.000 
 (2.32)** (2.20)** (0.15) (0.03) 
 
Income per capita 
squared 
 
0.002 
(1.14) 
 
 
0.000 
(0.13) 
 
 
Form of democratic 
government 
  
0.027 
(0.71) 
  
-0.142 
(1.49) 
 
Constant 
 
-0.048 
 
-0.401 
 
-1.473 
 
 (0.05) (0.55) (1.08) (2.64)*** 
 
Observations 
 
577 
 
568 
 
548 
 
541 
Number of codepays 117 115 101 100 
AR(1) 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.01 
AR(2) 0.10 0.12 0.23 0.59 
Hansen Test 0.27 0.22 0.40 0.25 
Number of 
instruments 
18 23 27 25 
NB: * significatif at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. The study period is 1960-2008. Temporal dummies are included. 
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Table 9 a: Effect of Democratic institutions on environment quality 
Log of carbon dioxide per capita 
(Two step GMM-System) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
    
Log of initial carbon dioxide  per 
capita 
0.844 
(6.57)*** 
0.874 
(14.04)*** 
0.785 
(12.03)*** 
0.911 
(20.36)*** 
 
 
Log of Democratic Institutions   -0.025 
(2.47)** 
-0.093 
(1.72)* 
-0.168 
(1.84)* 
-0.210 
(2.26)** 
 
 
Log of income per capita 0.019 0.005 -0.010 -0.017 
 (1.18) (0.62) (0.52) (1.72)* 
 
 Population growth 
 
-0.049 
 
-0.041 
 
-0.031 
 
-0.031 
 (1.22) (1.60) (1.10) (1.00) 
 
Log of Trade openness 
 
0.139 
 
-0.001 
 
0.342 
 
0.131 
 (1.01) (0.02) (2.71)*** (1.16) 
 
Log of  investment 
  
0.417 
  
0.446 
  (3.13)***  (2.73)*** 
 
Income inequality  
   
-0.037 
 
-0.020 
   (3.66)*** (2.30)** 
 
Constant 
 
-0.486 
 
-0.857 
 
0.960 
 
-0.164 
 (0.85) (1.88)* (1.76)* (0.21) 
Observations 887 823 608 577 
Number of countries  143 143 120 117 
 
AR (1) 
 
0,003 
 
0,01 
 
0,003 
 
0,008 
 
AR(2) 
 
0,73 
 
0,96 
 
0,13 
 
0,11 
 
Hansen Test 
 
 
0,13 
 
0,21 
 
0,35 
 
0,29 
Number of instruments 14 23 19 17 
NB: * significatif at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. The study period is 1960-2008. Dummy variables are included. 
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Table 9 b: Effect of Democratic institutions on environment quality 
Log of sulfurdioxide per 
capita(Two step GMM-System) 
          (1)             (2)              (3) (4) 
 
    
Log of initial  sulfurdioxide  per 
capita 
1.286 
(6.52)*** 
1.063 
 (13.78)*** 
0.852 
(32.00)*
** 
0.896 
(28.31)*** 
Log of Democratic Institutions   -0.022 
(2.19)** 
-0.110 
    (1.89)* 
-0.063 
(2.00)** 
  -0.289 
(1.87)* 
 
 
Log of income per capita 0.005 
(0.49) 
0.002 
(0.28) 
 
-0.002 
(0.26) 
-0.014 
(1.11) 
 Population growth 0.044 0.022 -0.015 -0.042 
 (0.83) (0.79) (0.61) (1.12) 
 
Log of Trade openness 
 
-0.153 
 
-0.107 
 
0.050 
 
-0.084 
 (1.39) (2.05)** (1.28) (1.48) 
 
Log of  investment 
  
0.191 
  
0.299 
  (3.13)***  (3.19)*** 
 
Income inequality  
   
-0.007 
 
-0.008 
   (2.11)** (1.45) 
 
Constant 
 
3.931 
 
0.779 
 
-1.447 
 
-0.564 
 (1.49) (0.73) (3.67)*** (0.65) 
Observations 813 751 577 548 
Number of countries  115 115 104 101 
AR (1) 0,04 0,01 0.03 0,04 
AR(2) 0,60 0,23 0.21 0,24 
Hansen Test 
 
       0,13           0,68           0.18        0,30 
Number of instruments 
        12            22           11          17 
NB: * significatif at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. The study period is 1960-2008. Dummy variables are included. 
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Table (10a): Effect on democratic institutions on environment quality with residual 
generated regressors 
Dependent variable Log of carbon dioxide per capita 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log of initial carbon 
dioxide  per capita 
0.826 
(13.67)*
** 
0.830 
(8.06)**
* 
 
0.820 
(11.13)*
** 
 
0.870 
(10.14)*
** 
 
0.902 
(20.45)
*** 
0.914 
(48.97)
*** 
Log of Democratic 
Institutions   
-0.123 
(1.83)* 
-0.119 
(2.08)** 
-0.144 
(2.15)** 
-0.13 
(1.69)* 
-0.195 
(2.03)*
* 
-0.187 
(2.55)*
* 
Log of income per 
capita 
0.005 
(0.63) 
-0.002 
(0.34) 
-0.005 
(0.34) 
-0.001 
(0.18) 
-0.019 
(2.10)*
* 
-0.012 
(1.85)* 
 
 Population growth 
 
-0.044 
 
-0.013 
 
-0.036 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.025 
 
0.001 
 
(1.36) (0.46) (0.79) (0.07) (0.67) (0.06) 
 
Log of Trade 
openness 
 
0.055 
(0.36) 
 
0.047 
(0.84) 
 
0.261 
(2.39)** 
 
0.061 
(0.87) 
 
0.12 
(1.02) 
 
-0.011 
(0.44) 
 
Investments 
 
0.494 
    
0.50 
 
 
(2.97)**
* 
   (2.85)*
** 
 
 
Investment residue 
  
0.858 
    
0.431 
  (2.65)**
* 
   (4.73)*
** 
Income inequality   -0.030 
(3.69)**
* 
 
 -0.021 
(2.35)*
* 
 
Income inequality 
residue 
   -0.023 
(2.19)** 
 -0.018 
(3.25)*
** 
     
Constant -1.237 0.294 0.840 0.198 -0.25 0.751 
 (1.63) (1.33) (1.72)* (0.48) (0.30) (3.28)*
** 
Observations 
Number countries 
823 
143 
823 
143 
608 
120 
608 
120 
577 
117 
577 
117 
AR(1) 0.01 0.00 0.001 0.004 0.01 0.006 
AR(2) 0.92 0.41 0.13 0.16 0.10 0.25 
Hansen test  0.44 0.68 0.11 0.13 0.29 0.30 
Instruments 15 17 19 12 17 20 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table (10b): Effect on democratic institutions on environment quality with residual 
generated regressors 
        
Dependent variable Log of sulfur dioxide per capita 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Log of initial sulfur 
dioxide  per capita 
 
0.991 
(7.06)*
** 
 
0.978 
(7.39)*
** 
 
 
0.852 
(32.00)
*** 
 
0.849 
(32.16)*
** 
 
0.879 
(11.33)
*** 
 
0.861 
(30.95)*
** 
Log of Democratic 
Institutions   
-0.203 
(2.59)*
* 
-0.191 
(2.51)*
* 
-0.063 
(2.00)*
* 
-0.087 
(2.62)** 
-0.268 
(2.07)*
* 
-0.254 
(2.04)** 
 
Log of income per 
capita 
 
0.003 
(0.49) 
 
-0.004 
(0.60) 
 
-0.002 
(0.26) 
 
-0.003 
(0.35) 
 
-0.012 
(1.31) 
 
-0.015 
(1.46) 
 
Population growth 
 
-0.016 
(0.31) 
 
0.000 
(0.01) 
 
-0.015 
(0.61) 
 
-0.003 
(0.13) 
 
-0.073 
(1.40) 
 
-0.036 
(0.81) 
Log of Trade 
openness 
 
-0.056 
(0.74) 
 
-0.059 
(0.83) 
 
0.050 
(1.28) 
 
0.049 
(1.30) 
 
-0.031 
(0.71) 
 
-0.006 
(0.13) 
 
Investments 
 
0.183 
(2.97)*
** 
 
 
   
0.351 
(3.91)*
** 
 
Investment residue  0.489 
(3.29)*
** 
   0.473 
(3.78)**
* 
Income inequality   -0.007 
(2.11)*
* 
 
 0.001 
(0.13) 
 
Income inequality 
residue 
 -0.012 
(2.14)** 
 -0.008 
(1.31) 
Constant 0.030 
(0.02 
0.441 
(0.27) 
-1.447 
(3.67)*
** 
-1.728 
(4.42)**
* 
-1.520 
(1.16) 
-0.813 
(1.40) 
Observations 751 751 577 577 548 548 
Number countries 115 115 104 104 101 101 
AR(1) 0.001 0.001 0,03 0.06 0,05 0.02 
AR(2) 0.15 0.14 0,21 0.50 0,24 0.21 
Hansen test 0.24 0.19 0,11 0.18 0,13 0.88 
Instruments 19 19 11 11 26 16 
Robust t statistics in parentheses* significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 11: Définition and  data sources  
Variables Définitions Source de données 
Emissions of carbon 
dioxide per capita 
Carbon dioxide per capita (metric ton per 
capita) 
 
 
Word  
Development 
Indicators (2008) 
Emissions per capita 
initial  
Carbon dioxide per capita at the beginning 
of each period  
Investment rate  Investment/PIB 
Trade openess rate (Exportations+Importations) / Gross 
Domestic Product 
Population growth rate Population growth rate 
 
Democratic institutions 
 
Combined score of democracy 
and autocracy on a scale going from -10 
to 10.  (- 10) large represents a big 
autocracy and 10, large democracy 
 
 
Polity IV 
Income Inequality EHII (Estimated Household Income 
Inequality) variable is an index ranging 
from 0 (no inequality) to 1 (perfect 
inequality)  
 University of Texas 
Inequality Project 
(UTIP) database 
(2008) 
 
 
   
 
